In March 1714, Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu, Prince of Wallachia (1688–1714), was deposed by Sultan Ahmed III, taken to Istanbul, imprisoned, tortured for several months and, finally, beheaded on 15 August of that year, together with his sons, Constantin, Ștefan, Radu and Matei, and his adviser Ianache Văcărescu. Historical sources, particularly foreign sources—the accounts of ambassadors from Western states who were in the capital of the Ottoman Empire at the time and were eyewitnesses to the events—make it very clear that the voivode was offered a pardon in exchange for converting to Islam. Having categorically refused this, his beheading became an act of martyrdom, and thus a conscious act, for which he attained the crown of sainthood, immediately recognised by his contemporaries and officially confirmed by the Romanian Orthodox Church on 20 June 1992, when the Brâncoveanu family were officially canonised 1.
These accounts by foreign diplomats, often cited in historiography for their value, have been mentioned and commented on previously in our studies 2; however, we now return to just one example, that of the official French envoy to Istanbul, Des Alleurs, who, on 3 September 1714, wrote to King Louis XIV stating: ‘They were all offered a pardon if they were willing to embrace the Muslim faith, which they all steadfastly refused’ 3. The French official’s statement is all the more significant as it comes from the representative of a power which, at that time, was hostile to Wallachia and its prince; for France, an ally of Russia and an adversary of England and the Ottoman Empire, had at one point even attempted to dethrone the Prince of Wallachia.
In the following lines, to supplement what has been said previously, we intend to focus primarily on internal sources, on the chroniclers’ accounts of the circumstances and causes that led to the deposition and beheading of the Wallachian voivode, in order to gain a broader picture of the events of 1714. Furthermore, certain Ottoman documents, discovered in the Turkish archives, translated and made available to the academic community by the late Prof. Mihai Maxim, help us gain a clearer understanding of the in the long term, that Brâncoveanu’s deposition had on Wallachia. We therefore highlight the following: the reasons that led to the prince’s removal from office, the individuals involved or who initiated these changes, the means by which they acted, the reflections of their actions in domestic historical sources, and the long-term consequences of this act for Wallachia.
Domestic chronicles state that a section of the Wallachian boyars played a key role in the events of 1714, for the voivode was deposed and beheaded not necessarily on the initiative of the sultan—who had confidence in Brâncoveanu—but primarily because of the conspiracy and intrigues that the Cantacuzino family had instigated at the Sublime Porte against him, with the aim of seizing power and the throne.
For example, Radu Popescu’s chronicle tells us that:
‘So great was Prince Ștefan’s zeal to wipe out the house of Prince Costandin that no human tongue can recount it [...] Yet, however hard Prince Ștefan strove to destroy his cousin Prince Costandin, he could not have brought about the downfall of Costandin himself and his sons, only that old thief, his father, Costandin the steward, who knew all the secrets of his nephew Prince Costandin (for he knew them all, regarding him not as an uncle but as a father), and he also knew of the documents from the Germans and the Muscovites, in which those emperors had issued charters appointing him and his sons as princes, and as boyars; and taking them from where they were, the old man himself carried them to the chamberlain4, to whom he gave them, begging him to hand them over to the emperor, so that he might see Prince Costandin’s wiles.”5
The Anonymous Chronicle of Wallachia tells us:
“Some who are worthy of belief say that, when the imbrihor was about to set out for Tsarigrad, Costandin the steward and Mihai the chamberlain went to him and, apart from the gifts they gave him—gold coins and other items— they told him he would do well to show loyalty to the Emperor, so that he might kill Costandin Voivode and his sons, for they had been treacherous towards the Emperor. And if he did this, good fortune would befall his son, Stephen the Prince, whom he had made lord and squire to the ‘6’. And with these slanderous words from these wicked and treacherous old men, and with the multitude of fools whom they had unwittingly gathered before the chief eunuch and a haseki who had come in a caftan from the Sublime Porte, who slandered Costandin Vodă as a traitor 7, a deceiver and other such things—these actions led to the downfall of Costandin Vodă, his sons and his household. Moreover, Ban Costandin Știrbei and Radu the Logothete Dudescul constantly harangued the nobles with slander, with fervour and with their tongues, until they had wiped that lord from the face of the earth. When all our people, and even strangers, heard of these deeds, they marvelled at how and in what way those who had been so well regarded, honour and mercy from Costandin Vodă, and such great wealth that they lacked for nothing, could have become his greatest enemies’8
By accusing him of treason before the Ottomans, through the exposure of his ties with the Christian powers, the members of the Cantacuzino family were effectively condemning him to death, for treason was a capital offence.
We also learn from the Anonymous Chronicle that, following the prince’s beheading, the Cantacuzinos plotted against the surviving members of the Brâncoveanu family in Istanbul, bribing the Turks to prevent them from returning to the country and instead have them sent into exile:
‘This was their penance for their sins. And Stephen the Great was not content merely with the death of Constantine the Great and his sons, but whilst the wife and sons-in-law of Constantine the Great and other men of his still remained, having escaped the danger of death—whom the Turks wished toallow them to return to the country; and he consulted with his father and their advisers that it was not fitting for them to return to the country, but that they should be sent into exile. And they devised a ruse with the intermediary and deceived them into handing over 80 bags of money, telling them that the Turks had said that if they paid this money, they would set them free; and in that hope they sent word to their families here in the country, who did as best they could, paying that money; whilst elsewhere they wrote to the imbrihor instructing him to ensure they were exiled to Kiutaiu, and to Anadol; and they were exiled with the money they had paid’9
Anton-Maria del Chiaro, who had been the voivode’s secretary, also emphasises the fact that Lady Maria, the wife of Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu, and her relatives had not been released, but exiled for three years to Kutajeh, due to the intrigues and machinations of the Cantacuzinos, who had paid the vizier 40,000 gold pieces to have their release revoked and to secure their exile. And all this had happened, even though the voivode had behaved with such honour towards the Cantacuzinos, as the same author tells us:
‘Prince Brâncoveanu granted the Cantacuzinos the highest honours and held his two uncles, Constantin and Mihai—the brothers of Șerban Cantacuzino, who were hanged in 1716—in particular esteem, one in Constantinople and the other in Adrianople’10
Dimitrie Cantemir, too, although he held different political views from the Prince of Muntenia, recalls Ștefan Cantacuzino’s intrigues at the Sublime Porte, aimed at having Lady Maria Brâncoveanu exiled 11.
As was later seen, the reason the Cantacuzinos removed Constantin Brâncoveanu was not necessarily his political stance, but their desire to come to power, to effectively take over the rule of the country. By accusing him of treason before the Ottomans, through the exposure of his links with the Christian powers, the members of the Cantacuzino family were effectively condemning him to death, for treason was a capital offence. Dimitrie Cantemir, for example, recalls that, after being deposed, rulers could remain alive and live in Istanbul, sometimes buying their freedom with money, and that, following their removal from the throne, they were regarded with a certain degree of honour, exempt from taxes and enjoying certain privileges not afforded to ordinary Christians:
‘the danger threatening him is greater when the whole country complains of an excessive tax burden. And if he is found guilty of this, he is usually punished with exile or the confiscation of his property, for only rebellion or refusal to pay the annual tribute brings the death penalty upon the princes’ heads’12’
Thus, the Cantacuzinos were not seeking his deposition—that is, his removal from the throne (which did not automatically lead to execution, but merely to the loss of office)—but rather the annihilation of the prince. In the same vein, Anton Maria del Chiaro, after listing the charges against Brâncoveanu put forward by the Cantacuzinos to the Turks, notes:
“These were the main charges sent to the Sublime Porte with the aim of killing, along with his entire family, one of the finest princes Wallachia had ever known”13
Dimitrie Cantemir wrote that, upon hearing the news of the Wallachian prince’s deposition, Constantin Cantacuzino:
“like a crocodile, with one eye he pretended to be sorry and wept for Brâncoveanu’s misfortune, whilst with the other he rejoiced and celebrated the fulfilment of his wish [...] Imprisoned, Brâncoveanu might have escaped the death sentence had Prince Ștefan Cantacuzino and his father Constantin, with their ceaseless slander, with their just and unjust accusations, had not stirred up the Sultan’s fury against him and had not ceaselessly slandered him, both in secret and openly, against poor Brâncoveanu, fearlessly revealing his correspondence—both the oldest and the most recent—with the Christian rulers, as well as his plans to betray the Sultan at the opportune moment. Adding to these evils even worse ones, they sent ahead of him, as Imbrihor-aga was departing from Bucharest, a few men bearing petitions, instructed by them, who complained to him that during Brâncoveanu’s many years of tyranny they had been ruined by him, as a large part of their wealth had been given to the kesar, the Tsar and other Christian rulers, in order to win their favour through lavish gifts, so that now, because of poverty and plundering, they had no means of paying the Sultan’s taxes14
Dimitrie Cantemir also tells us that, following the beheading of the Brâncovenis, their bodies were thrown into the sea, whilst the heads were paraded through the town by an official, who shouted that ‘this is how all traitors will end’15, thereby emphasising the guilt and the reason for the execution: treason. All the accusations levelled by Cantacuzini centred on Brâncoveanu’s alleged emancipation from the Turks, and on the acceptance and support of this by foreign powers (which had granted him diplomas and a hereditary principality 16 as well as protection 17), and thus on his covert anti-Ottoman policy. The Prince of Wallachia did, in fact, maintain an extensive correspondence with the Christian powers, even using ciphers in his diplomatic missions. The Turks had granted the Wallachian prince a lifetime reign from 1699, a grant likely confirmed in 1703 during his visit to Adrianople. This lifetime reign, granted by official documents—not verbally, but by a ‘berat’—is even mentioned by Brâncoveanu himself in his secret notes: ‘The Emperor has drawn the hat for the barat of 18.’ This trust placed in Brâncoveanu by the Ottomans now became an aggravating factor, especially as a lifetime reign was something atypical, a favour. The most serious charge levelled by Cantacuzini was that the prince was treacherous towards the Turks, because, although he had a treaty with them and paid tribute, he maintained links and correspondence with the Habsburg Empire, Russia and other European states, with a view to pursuing an anti-Ottoman policy and, possibly, armed action. The accusations were presented to the Turks as being authenticated by princely seals, but these, as the chronicles – Del Chiaro and the Anonymous Chronicle – tell us, had been forged in Brașov; thus, for the purpose of Brâncoveanu’s deposition and murder, forgery was committed and the forged documents were used. Of course, the Turks also wished to confiscate the wealth of the Wallachian prince19, known as the ‘Prince of Gold’ (Altân-bey), again under a legal pretext, that of treason.
The accusations were presented to the Turks as being authenticated by princely seals, but these, as the chronicles tell us, had been forged in Brașov.
After enjoying good relations at the start of his reign, Constantin Brâncoveanu gradually distanced himself from the Cantacuzino family due to differing views on foreign policy, which is why he also removed the spătar Mihai Cantacuzino from office in 1706. The strained relations between the prince and that boyar family intensified following Toma Cantacuzino’s defection and flight to Russia, which led to the confiscation of the fugitive’s assets on grounds of treachery. In 1714, the Cantacuzinos showed themselves to be friends of the Ottomans andaccused the Prince of Muntenia of disloyalty, whilst they themselves were the proponents of a clear, overtly anti-Ottoman policy, which proved to be ill-advised at that time and in that historical context.
Brâncoveanu’s relations with the Habsburg Empire and Russia—cooperative yet prudent—proved to be the right course of action 20. Through his foreign policy, Brâncoveanu avoided replacing Ottoman rule with Habsburg rule (as he had seen happen in Transylvania, which had been incorporated into the Habsburg Empire) or with Russian rule (especially as Russia had interests and conflicts in the northern region at that time). After some tense moments at the start of his reign, Brâncoveanu had established good political relations with both the Habsburg Empire and Russia, and had made peace with the Ottomans in exchange for the payment of tribute, in accordance with the capitulations. The Prince of Wallachia had supported the Turkish–Habsburg peace negotiations (1691), backed by England and the Netherlands, for which he received, from the Habsburgs, the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire (1695). Brâncoveanu also drew closer to Russia and initiated negotiations with it to pursue an anti-Ottoman policy; in 1700, he was decorated by the Tsar with the Cross of St Andrew. He maintained diplomatic relations with the England of King William III (1689–1702) and with its ambassador to the Sublime Porte, which drew the hostility of France, which supported certain Wallachian boyars in plotting against the Wallachian prince. In return, England supported the claims of the Orthodox Christians in Transylvania before the Habsburgs, partly through Brâncoveanu’s mediation, but also out of its own desire – as a Protestant country – to curb the power of Catholic France 21.
Brâncoveanu’s political acumen was evident in 1711, following the defeat of the Russians at Stănilești. However, the Cantacuzinos, disregarding the actual, concrete situation, pursued their own pro-Russian foreign policy, independent of that of the prince, whom they themselves had accused of treason before the Ottomans.
One of the charges levelled against Brâncoveanu was that Toma Cantacuzino had allegedly allied himself with the Russians with the knowledge of the Wallachian prince, although the Anonymous Chronicle clearly tells us that the spătar acted on his own initiative:
“And Toma, the spătar Săitănescu, driven by his mad pride—for he had always harboured thoughts of rulership or of his uncles’ counsel—abandoned the honour he had received from his prince and the prosperity he enjoyed […] went to the Muscovites without the consent or knowledge of Costandin Vodă’22.
Following the conclusion of the peace between the Turks and the Russians 23, due to Toma’s actions, during the reign of Ștefan Cantacuzino, Wallachia was placed in danger, its borders being breached, particularly by the people of Brăila (Kazaua Brăilei being under Ottoman administration at that time 24), as the Anonymous Chronicle also recounts:
‘After this, the Turks of Brăila, harbouring envy towards the country because Toma Spătarul Cantacuzino had come there with the Muscovites and made great plunder, decided to stir up a dispute over the borders to be settled with Wallachia and entered the country along the border to seize large tracts of land from all the border areas, from all the villages along the frontier, as far as near the town of Flocii, where he had placed the subaș25, who collected customs duties for them at the marshes [...] However, in the end the boyars of the country prevailed by virtue of their right and obtained a decree from the qadi 26, stipulating that the old boundaries should be restored, and they drew up a document stating that they had driven out the subașis from the villages”27.
Indeed, the Turkish archives preserve both the complaint lodged by the people of Brăila regarding the violation of their territory by Brâncoveanu (for that is how they perceived it, Brâncoveanu being the ruler of Wallachia at the time of the attack), as well as the subsequent complaint by Ștefan Cantacuzino against the violation of the Wallachian border by28e of Brăila 29. Between 18 and 27 November 1714, Sultan Ahmed III called upon the qadis of Brăila to respect the inviolability of Wallachian borders, as the violation of these borders was contrary to custom 30.
Although these tensions were local in nature—border incidents— rather than an official attempt by the central authorities to transform the country into a pashalik, nevertheless, the episode recounted in the chronicle illustrates Toma Cantacuzino’s recklessness on the one hand, and Brâncoveanu’s political discernment on the other. The political and legal status of the Romanian principalities as tributary states was also favoured at that time by the Ottoman Empire, owing to the significant economic advantages that indirect rule brought to the Porte; the subsequent choice of Phanariot rulers demonstrates precisely that the Ottomans were not attempting to transform the country into a pashalik 31. However, ‘for the Romanian Principalities, the immediate and long-term implications of the campaign and the Peace of the Prut in 1711 were grave and painful’32; for, after Brâncoveanu, the Turks abandoned the system of local rulers and preferred to govern through Greeks from Phanar, thus ushering in the so-called Phanariot period, even though, in essence, the legal relationship with the Ottoman Empire remained unchanged, we remained tributaries of the Sublime Porte until the War of Independence in 1877.
Even before his dismissal, Brâncoveanu had faced problems due to the campaign at Brăila. For example, a document from 1712–1713—a complaint addressed to the Imperial Divan by a wealthy Greek from Brăila, Manas—shows that four boyars from Wallachia (Muscovite ghiaurs, that is, allies of the Russians), during the military campaign, had many of his possessions seized, amounting to 8 bags; the Greek asks the Divan to authorise the recovery of the money, through an order from the Sublime Porte to the Prince of Wallachia,33. Furthermore, the order of Sultan Ahmed III, dated 7–26 March 1714, addressed to the mumbașir 34 Mustafa regarding the arrest of Brâncoveanu, accused of treason, also states that the Prince of Muntenia supported those who plundered and looted the wealth of the rich in the raials 35. An important document from the Turkish archives, which lists the reasons leading to the prince’s deposition, also includes the fact that Brâncoveanu captured Brăila 36.
The actions taken by the Ottomans at the time of Brâncoveanu’s deposition show that they had a covenant with the Romanians, set out in a set of rights and obligations, whereby Wallachia (included in ‘dar-al-ahd’, that is, within the realm of the covenant), in exchange for the payment of tribute—as a ransom for Islamic peace—was able to retain its autonomy, internal institutions, religion and Christian rule. No Muslim fortresses or mosques were built, no children were conscripted into the Ottoman army, Sharia law was not enforced, and the practice of tahrirs (land surveys) did not exist. By virtue of these provisions, the Romanian Principalities retained their lands, which could not be confiscated by the Turks or granted as timars 37 to Muslims, particularly for military service 38.
For example, in the judgement (fetva) issued against Brâncoveanu, he was accused of treason, as a traitor, ‘whilst he was in alliance and in agreement and had a covenant (ahd) with the Sultan’39. And treason was a grave offence, for it violated the provisions of the covenant with the Turks, which, although they allowed the country its autonomy and institutions, they curtailed its independence and its right to an independent foreign policy, demanding that the prince be “a friend to the friends and an enemy to the enemies (dosta dost ve dușmana dușman olub)” of the Ottoman Empire. Romanian–Ottoman relations, apart from a few abuses, took place within the limits of the provisions of the capitulations, which, although the originals have not been preserved, did indeed exist. Mihai Maxim, who specialised in the history of the Romanians as recorded in Ottoman documents, discovered in the Turkish archives a letter to the Sultan from the Wallachian voivode Ștefan Cantacuzino, dated 24 May 1715, which referred to ‘the capitulations (ahidname), which were granted to us and which we hold in our possession’40 Thus, at that time, the documents existed and were still preserved in Wallachia.
The Ottomans respected Wallachia’s autonomous status, as provided for in the capitulations. Further evidence comes from the fact that the movable property of the prince deemed a traitor was confiscated and sold at auction by the Turks, just as his foreign assets were, but his estates were left untouched, as they were the lands of the country:
“Turkish documents recently discovered in the archives in Istanbul reveal 41 that all the gold and silver found were confiscated from the former prince, 222,487 sheep and goats, 1,969 horses, 1,625 oxen and cows, the wines, houses and carriages, books, jewellery, etc., but not the 179 estates in the country (ciftlik), together with the horses and the villa at San Stefano, situated outside the country, which were confiscated from him42”.
Anton Maria del Chiaro also mentions the auctioning off of Brâncoveanu’s movable property in Wallachia, in a passage in which the author also highlights the harshness of the new prince, Ștefan Cantacuzino, towards the members of Brâncoveanu’s family who remained in the country, whom he did not even allow access to a doctor in times of need:
‘Imbrohorul opened Brâncoveanu’s private treasury in Bucharest, which had been sealed by the executioner43, and drew up an inventory of the riches found: money, jewels of great value, superb garments, mostly lined with sable and other precious furs brought from Moscow. The tableware, furniture and all the household effects were sold at auction by the Turks, in full view of the remaining Princesses, whilst the new ruler had seen fit to prohibit, by strict order, any assistance—even from doctors in the event of illness—being given to the family of the dethroned prince44
On 11 September 1716, Ahmed III issued an order to the nazir of the Sublime Porte’s mint to revalue and melt down into ingots the silver and gold-plated vessels previously confiscated from Constantin Brâncoveanu and from Ștefan Cantacuzino, who had since been deposed and executed 45.
Regarding Brâncoveanu’s movable assets, particularly the money deposited at the Zecca Bank in Venice, the Greek chronicler Constantin Dapontes states that it was not taken from the subjects through taxes, but derived from the proper management of his own assets, belonging to the princely treasury, not the state treasury:
‘This vast sum was not collected from the subjects, from the inhabitants of the country, that is to say from haragi and other taxes, as the present rulers do now. Rather, the entire sum of money came from the income of his own possessions—from beehives, sheep, oxen, horses, pigs, gardens and lands—and from certain princely revenues of the chamber, not of the treasury’46”.
The interest on the money from Venice was used to support the Princely Academy of Saint Sava in Bucharest, which the same prince had transformed into a prestigious educational institution, as the prince himself tells us in a charter dated 1 September 1707 47.
This is just one example among countless deeds through which Saint Constantine Brâncoveanu supported the Orthodox Church 48, education and theological scholarship in the Romanian Principalities and abroad, as far afield as the region of Georgia or the Habsburg Empire 49. Frequently cited in historical accounts, Saint Constantine Brâncoveanu’s donations to the Orthodox world are always worthy of mention, given their significance, as they were made at a time when the Orthodox Church was in a difficult situation, the territories under its pastoral care having been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Although non-Muslims in the Empire were not officially killed or persecuted, they faced a more difficult economic and legal situation 50 compared to Muslims, and the churches had fallen into a state of poverty, burdened by taxes, many in a state of disrepair or ruin, and the monks were in dire straits. The donations to the Christian world were distortedly presented as accusations of squandering public funds by Brâncoveanu’s enemies, just as we recall the intrigues presented to the prince and recounted by Dimitrie Cantemir.
…the donations made by Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu to the Orthodox Church are always worthy of mention, given their significance, as they were made at a time when the Orthodox Church found itself in a difficult situation, the territories over which it exercised its pastoral care having been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.
We shall now present further examples, drawn from the documents preserved in the Register of the Grand Logothete, to remind us of the special attention shown by the Wallachian prince to Orthodoxy as a whole. For example, on Mount Athos, Saint Constantine Brâncoveanu aided the monasteries of Saint Athanasius (with a grant of 6,000 bani, in 1695–1696), Vatopedi (with 20,000 bani, by charter dated 18 November 1696), St Paul’s (by the deed of 11 May 1698, granting it an annual endowment of 150 thalers) and Dionysius (to which he confirmed, on 6 March 1713, the annual endowment of 100 thalers). In the latter case, the motivation is striking, namely that the monks might be able to provide for themselves and no longer have to leave the monastery to collect alms with the holy relics, so that these might be safeguarded and not lost—a stipulation which demonstrates the prince’s love for the Saints and their holy relics, as well as his care for the monks:
‘For these reasons, therefore, I, Io Costandin Basarab, Voivode, finding myself at this time, by the grace of God, to rule and hold the throne of Wallachia, since, amongst other things, we have been deemed worthy by Divine Providence of this blessing, namely to behold with our own eyes and kiss with our lips the honourable and most holy relics of the Most Glorious Forerunner, Prophet and Baptist John, which, in worship and as a sign of sanctification,have been brought to us as a priceless treasure, being kept and safeguarded in the holy and divine monastery honoured in the name of this glorious Forerunner and Prophet, namely Dionysius, situated on the holy and divine Mount Athos; for my lordship deems it unseemly for the fathers of this holy monastery to remove and carry, these most honoured and grace-bestowing relics from one place to another, lest anything improper or harmful should occur, whether by sea or by land, as is ever the case with evildoers. And should they be lost, this holy monastery and the community of all Orthodox Christians will be deprived of such a treasure, worthy of many blessings’51
The region south of the Danube, which was also under Muslim rule, benefited from Brâncoveanu’s attention; he bestowed alms upon the Holy Trinity Monastery in the Târnov Mountains (founded by Prince Șișman, with the Mountanian prince’s charter dating from 14 March 1697), and Brodeț (founded by Pogonat, to which the Mountanian prince granted an annual endowment of 9,000 galbeni)52. Furthermore, Brâncoveanu supported the Pogoniani Monastery in Rumelia (with 3,000 bani a year, by deed dated 8 December 1696), Trebina in Serbian Country (8 January 1702), the Patriarchate of Antioch (which received the sum of 500 thalers a year for the duration of the prince’s life, by the charter of 20 September 1702) and the church at Sarai in Tsarigrad (12 November 1699)53.
The Prince was known at the time as a supporter of Christians, which is why monks came to him seeking help. For example, the document addressed to the monastery in the Târnov Mountains states that:
‘Now the monastic brothers from this holy monastery have come, bringing to our lordship prayers and blessings from all the holy fathers there […] my lordship having understood the petition of the holy fathers there, that this holy monastery has fallen into a state of neglect and, due to many events that have taken place there, is in great poverty, whilst the area surrounding it is in a state of ruin, and having no benefit nor income from any source, I, too, from the depths of my heart, longed to be named the new founder of this holy monastery’54
Several internal documents issued by the Phanariot rulers Ioan, Nicolae and Constantin Mavrocordat attest, on the one hand, to the fact that Brâncoveanu, before being beheaded, was imprisoned and tortured, thus confirming and supplementing the accounts of foreign ambassadors which we have mentioned in our previous works; and, on the other hand, that Toma Cantacuzino had acted treacherously towards Brâncoveanu, and had therefore acted without his consent. Thus, in a document dated 16 May 1717, in which Ioan Mavrocordat, Prince of Wallachia, exempted Manolache Lambrino—Brâncoveanu’s son-in-law and Bălașa’s husband—from taxes, it is stated that Manolache was in Constantinople at the time of the prince’s execution and that his property had been confiscated:
‘Thus, having taken everything they possessed, the imperial authorities left them in utter poverty and want; and when his father-in-law arrived in Tsarigrad with his wife Mariia, with their sons and the other sons-in-law, and as this worthy and blessed prince, his father-in-law, was subjected to harsher imprisonment and punishments, they also took Aga Manolache and his wife, Lady Bălașa, together with all the other sons-in-law, all being held in one prison, until the late Costandin Vodă and his sons were deprived of their sovereignty55”.
Manolache Lambrino’s privileges and estates were also confirmed by subsequent rulers. On 10 December 1719, Nicolae Mavrocordat granted to Manolache, who was Grand Clucer at that time, the villages of Filipeștii de Pădure and Găujani, which had previously belonged to Toma Cantacuzino and Matei Fălcoianu, who had fled 56. On 1 August 1741, Constantin Mavrocordat bestowed upon Manolache Lambrino—who had become Grand Ban of Craiova—the villages, estates and vineyards that had belonged to the spătar Toma Cantacuzino, who had proved himself a traitor 57. However, as the deed dated 1 April 1745 shows, Manolache Lambrino and his wife bequeathed these estates to the Church of Domnița Bălașa, their own foundation, stipulating that Toma too should be included in the memorial service:
‘Having raised this holy church from its foundations and adorned it with all the appropriate ornaments, and having adorned it with vestments of honour and other holy ecclesiastical vesselsfrom our joint possessions—both from my own rightful earnings and acquisitions, and from my wife, Lady Bălașa, from her parental dowry—I have endowed it, giving her as a gift both movable and immovable property […] I have also given and dedicated to this holy place the aforementioned portions of Tomii the Spathar […] And since these portions of the estate and all the other items mentioned above are stated to have belonged to Toma the Spatar, have been bestowed upon us as a gift by His Highness, with all our wholehearted consent we decree that his name be perpetually and eternally commemorated during the holy liturgies, just as that of true founders alongside us and Toma the Spatar”58
Internal narrative sources also recount several unusual events that took place shortly before the deposition of Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu and then on the day of his execution.
For example, Anton-Maria del Chiaro mentions the vision experienced by the voivode’s eldest daughter, Stanca, before she died. This event took place after her father had been secretly informed that he was to be deposed and advised to take steps to save himself; however, he had paid no heed to the news, for, as the same author tells us:
‘Brâncoveanu was so naive that he did not believe in the possibility of betrayal […] During these days of indecision, the Voivode’s eldest daughter, Lady Stanca, fell ill; in her death throes she summoned her mother, her mother and her sisters, and, whilst hallucinating, showed them a band of Turks seizing her father by the scruff of the neck, intent on taking him to Constantinople. She was only with great difficulty calmed by those around her, but died a few hours later. This is what the deceased’s sisters told me, before their father’s dethronement’59
Radu Popescu’s chronicle informs us that, on 15 August 1714, whilst the voivode, his sons and his adviser Ianache Văcărescu were being executed in Istanbul, in Wallachia, at the Dintr-un Lemn Monastery, a strange event took place, which the chronicler regarded as a punishment from God sent upon the Cantacuzinos, who had plotted against Brâncoveanu, their benefactor. Here are the author’s words:
‘Whereupon Prince60, being greatly angered, ordered that Prince Costandin and his sons—four at a time—be brought before him, where he sat in a gazebo by the sea, and their heads were cut off in his presence. But first those of the sons, that is, his own, on the day of the Feast of the Assumption; and thus ended Prince Costandin, his sons and his wealth, his downfall coming at the hands of his own kin, who had honoured them and enriched them, so that they were like lords, and they, in turn, rewarded them with this very loyalty. And here in the country a great miracle occurred, which is worthy of being recorded. Whilst the wife of Stephen the Prince was at the Dintr-un-Lemn Monastery (having gone there for her devotion) on the feast day of the Great Saint Mary, when Constantine the Prince and his sons were beheaded in Constantinople, on that very day, the Queen, 61, arrived at the monastery in great distress because of all the atrocities, yet she did not in any way realise that God’s punishment had come upon them to repay them for their deeds. Instead, they suspected one of the lady’s aunts, her sister, namely Olimbiada, a nun for many years, of having cast spells with other women who had fallen on hard times; and so they sent her to another nunnery, where they shut her away in a cell, whilst the two women were hanged’62
The anonymous chronicle recounts the event as follows:
“In this way did the people of Șăitănești show their gratitude to Prince Costandin for the good he had done them. They destroyed his house and killed him and his sons, as will be recounted below […] But God, Who never deceives, began to send miracles into the world, so that all might know that the people of Șăitănești and their kind are not gods, but that it is the great and mighty God Who alone performs miracles.
But the first miracle was that when Stephen the Prince sent his wife and his sons to the wooden monastery, where there is an icon of the Most Holy Mother of God, the miracle-worker, for worship and as a sign of piety—this took place on the feast day of the Great Mary, that is, the Dormition of the Most Holy Mother of God—and whilst his wife was there at the monastery, on which day, in Tsarigrad, Constantine Voivode and his sons were beheaded (a miracle), on that very same day, this lady of Stephen the Prince was struck by a sudden, fierce fit of madness, so that all who were there with her were terrified and wondered what to do. And they remained in that state of madness for a long time. And whilst this was happening, Ștefan Vodă and his men still did not come to realise the sin they had committed, for which God had wrought a great miracle, causing his lady to be bewitched and to fall into a state of bewitchment, but they claimed that the nuns there, together with a certain nun named Olinbieada—who was Lady Păunii’s aunt, her mother’s sister—had bewitched her; and they subjected them all to severe punishment, hanging some of those womenwere even hanged, whilst his aunt Olimbiea was sent to the monastery at Bațcov and walled up in a cell, with only a small window through which bread and water were passed to her”.
The two chronicles, recounting the unusual event that befell Păuna, pinpoint it in time (15 August 1714) and place (the Dintr-un Lemn Monastery) and explain it very clearly: God’s punishment for the Cantacuzino family’s betrayal of Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu. Instead of repenting for their sin, as the texts tell us, blamed some nuns, claiming they had cast spells on Păunei, a pretext on the basis of which Mother Olimpiada was sent to a nunnery and confined to a cell. The measure taken against Olimpiada, if it was indeed carried out and not subsequently revoked, can be explained as an act of revenge by Ștefan Cantacuzino.
Păuna, the daughter of Andronic Greceanu and sister of Șerban Greceanu, was the wife of the Wallachian prince Ștefan Cantacuzino, who was the son of Constantin Cantacuzino, the stolnic. We know that, following the murder of her husband in Istanbul in 1716, Păuna sought refuge at the Dutch embassy; she entrusted her cash assets to several private individuals in the capital of the Ottoman Empire for safekeeping, and then fled on an English ship to Western Europe63 Upon arriving in Italy, she appealed to Pope Clement XI (1700–1721) to intervene with the Habsburg Emperor Charles VI (1711–1740) to support her in recovering the money 64. On 28 September 1716, the Pope interceded with the Emperor on behalf of Lady Păuna, and the following year, 1717, she herself asked him for help. The Austrian Field Marshal Eugene of Savoy (on 25 April 1717) and the War Council (14 July 1717) reminded the Emperor of the former Lady of Wallachia’s wish to be supported and, furthermore, for the principality of Wallachia to be granted to her son, Radu Cantacuzino. She therefore wished to recover the money and secure the principality of Wallachia for her son, Radu, following the murder of her husband, Ștefan Cantacuzino, by the Turks in 1716 65. With the help of Toma Cantacuzino, Păuna spent some time in Russia (1720–1725), but died in 1740 in Transylvania, at Recea 66.
It is worth noting in this context that one of Păuna’s sons, Radu Cantacuzino, obtained several privileges from Emperor Charles VI on the basis of forged documents. Furthermore, he and his brother had unlawfully appropriated the title legally bestowed upon Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu, that of Prince of the Roman Empire, using it for their own benefit and to enhance their reputation in the Western world 67. As an example of this falsification of genealogy, we may recall, for instance, the titles used in 1735 by Radu Cantacuzino, who presented himself as a legitimate descendant of Constantine the Great, Duke of Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Despot of the Peloponnese, Prince of Thessaly and Marquis of Ilfov 68. Radu Cantacuzino engaged in a veritable trade in forged diplomas, for a fee, which provoked the indignation of the Imperial Court in Vienna, which prohibited the descendant of the Byzantine emperors from continuing such activity, restricting his rights to the use of the title of ‘Constantinian Knight’ to bearers of the Cantacuzino name only 69. We recall, for example, a diploma bearing a coat of arms granted by Radu (Rudolf) Cantacuzino to Baron Ioan Carol de Wallstadt on 2 January 1744 in Vienna, by which the recipient was named Count of Alba and granted native status in Wallachia. Radu Cantacuzino conferred this distinction in his capacity as Grand Master of the Order of St George. The document, comprising 12 sheets of parchment and adorned with coats of arms and miniatures, is preserved at the Library of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest 70.
The fate of those who plotted against Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu was a grim one 71. We recall that Prince Ștefan Cantacuzino was killed in Istanbul, together with his father, the steward Constantin, on 7 June 1716. Constantin Cantacuzino the steward 72 (son of the chamberlain Constantin Cantacuzino) was Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu’s uncle and his counsellor, whom the prince regarded more as a father figure 73. Brâncoveanu was related to the Cantacuzinos; his mother, Stanca, who was married to Papa Brâncoveanu, was the sister of Șerban Cantacuzino, the former prince of Wallachia (1678–1688), and of Constantin Cantacuzino the steward, so Stanca was the daughter of Constantin Cantacuzino, the postelnic, and of Elina. Elina, in turn, was the daughter of the former Wallachian prince Radu Șerban (1601, 1602–1610, 1611)74. Mihai Cantacuzino, the steward’s brother, and Radu Dudescu were also killed by the Turks.
Toma Cantacuzino, Grand Spathar, who defected to the Russians in 1711, had been Brâncoveanu’s trusted aide, serving as the Wallachian prince’s envoy to Istanbul in 1703, to Adrianople in 1704 and to Brașov in 1709. Gradually, he distanced himself from the Transylvanian prince’s foreign policy and secretly maintained, unbeknownst to Brâncoveanu, relations with the Russians, with a view to open anti-Ottoman military collaboration. To this end, he made contact with Tsar Peter I the Great (1672–1725) and with the Prince of Moldavia, Dimitrie Cantemir (1693, 1710–1711), and took part with his soldiers in the capture of Brăila (July 1711). However, his involvement in the Russian military campaign proved ill-advised, as the Russians were defeated at Stănilești. This demonstrated once again the political acumen and discernment of Brâncoveanu, who had avoided an open military confrontation with the Ottomans, although, as we know, he maintained correspondence with the Russians and the Habsburgs. Toma Cantacuzino was Brâncoveanu’s cousin, the son of the agha Matei Cantacuzino, and thus the grandson of Constantin Cantacuzino, the postelnic. Following the defeat of the Russians in 1711, he fled to Russia, where he was held in particularly high regard by the Tsar, who appointed him Major-General, and subsequently entrusted him with important missions, including overseeing the construction of the Baltic Sea–Sea of Azov canal, starting from Lake Ladoga 75. He died in 1721 and was buried in Moscow 76.
In conclusion, we note that:
i. Internal sources indicate that Brâncoveanu was betrayed by his own relatives, the Cantacuzinos, who sought to seize power and the throne. Pretending to be loyal to the Turks, they accused the Wallachian prince of being a traitor and of planning to break free from Ottoman rule.
ii. Removed from office, the prince was tortured into making a declaration of his assets (again against a backdrop of boyar intrigues), then beheaded, as he refused the proposed pardon—which the mufti had secured for him and his family, but which was conditional upon his conversion to Islam. These events are also attested to by external sources.
iii. The foreign policy pursued by Brâncoveanu proved to be safer for the country than that proposed by Cantacuzini; for Russia had no interest in the Balkan region at that time, whilst the Habsburg Empire sought to extend its own dominion into these regions, and succeeded in incorporating Transylvania. However, unlike the Turks, who granted the Principalities complete religious freedom, the Habsburgs displayed religious intolerance.
iv. The methods by which the Cantacuzinos (who had enjoyed the prince’s honour and support!) secured the voivode’s deposition and murder were: intrigues, forgery and the use of forged documents, inciting Ottoman officials and the sultan against the prince, the portrayal of his good deeds as a misappropriation of funds, and his betrayal (as the voivode’s advisers, they were aware of his secret correspondence with Christian states and knew the cipher variants).
See: Internal sources indicate that Păuna, the wife of Ștefan Cantacuzino, became possessed whilst plotting against the prince, and this is explained by sources contemporary to the event as a punishment from God. Those who plotted to kill Brâncoveanu (in particular Ștefan and Constantin Cantacuzino) were themselves killed by the Turks two years later, in 1716.
vi. In the long term, the Romanian Principalities suffered as a result of these events, for the Turks, having lost their trust in the local princes following the actions of Dimitrie Cantemir and Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu, appointed Phanariot rulers, even though, officially, the political and legal status of the Principalities remained unchanged—they remained tributary states; yet interference in their internal affairs and the economic pressure exerted upon them increased.
vii. By upholding the Orthodox faith, at the cost of their lives, Constantin Brâncoveanu, his sons Constantin, Ștefan, Radu and Matei, and his adviser Ianache Văcărescu attained the crown of martyrdom and were subsequently officially canonised. This martyr’s death crowned, in the case of the Prince of Muntenia, a whole life dedicated to helping Christendom in its hour of need!
- 1
For refusing to convert to Islam and choosing a Christian death rather than a life of apostasy, Calinic, Metropolitan of Heraclea—who later became Ecumenical Patriarch—and who had witnessed the events, dedicated a hymn to them, in which he called them martyrs, sacrificed for Christ and His Mother. See P.Ș. Năsturel, ‘A Greek account of the martyrdom of Prince Brâncoveanu’, in Lupta, Paris, IX, 7, 1987, no. 85, p. 7, reprinted in Verbum, VI–VII, 1995–1996, no. 7, pp. 289–291. Fr. Acad. Niculae M. Popescu, The Life and Deeds of Constantin Vodă Brâncoveanu, Prince of Wallachia, Bucharest, Ed. Dar din Dar, 2013, p. 77, referred to them in this work—dedicated to the two-hundredth anniversary of their deaths—as true martyrs of our Romanian nation.
- 2
Oana-Mădălina Popescu, ‘Accounts of Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu’, in Theology and Life, 2012, nos. 5–8, pp. 132–166; Ibid., Testimonies about the Holy Martyrs of the Brâncoveanu Family: Prince Constantin and his four sons, Constantin, Ștefan, Radu and Matei, Iași, Doxologia Publishers, 2014. I have also included the bibliography on this subject here.
- 3
They were all offered a pardon if they were willing to convert to Islam, which they consistently refused. Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, Documents relating to the history of the Romanians (hereinafter Hurmuzaki), vol. I, 1, Bucharest, 1886, p. 430.
- 4
Imbrihor, imbrohor – the Sultan’s envoy to the Romanian Principalities. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language, Bucharest, Saeculum Publishers, 2013, p. 622.
- 5
Radu Popescu, the Vornic, The Histories of the Princes of Wallachia, ed. Constantin Grecescu, Bucharest, Publishing House of the Romanian People’s Republic Academy, 1963, pp. 208–209.
- 6
Cirac – favourite, trusted servant. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 286.
- 7
Jacaș – a plunderer, a predator. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 710.
- 8
The History of Wallachia from October 1688 to March 1717. An Anonymous Chronicle, ed. Constantin Grecescu, Bucharest, Ed. Științifică, 1959, p. 120.
- 9
The History of Wallachia from October 1688 to March 1717. The Anonymous Chronicle..., pp. 117, 122–123.
- 10
Anton-Maria del Chiaro Fiorentino, The Revolutions of Wallachia, translated in 1929 by S. Cris-Cristian, Iași, Tehnopress, 2005, pp. 132, 111.
- 11
Dimitrie Cantemir, ‘A Brief Account of the Extermination of the Brâncoveanu and Cantacuzino Families’, in Ibid., Complete Works, vol. VI, tome II, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Press, 1996, p. 101.
- 12
Dimitrie Cantemir, A Description of Moldavia, Bucharest, Ed. Academiei, 1973, pp. 193–196.
- 13
Anton-Maria del Chiaro Fiorentino, The Revolutions of Wallachia..., pp. 117–118.
- 14
Dimitrie Cantemir, A Brief Account of the Extermination of the Brâncoveanu and Cantacuzino Families..., p. 99.
- 15
Dimitrie Cantemir, A Brief Account of the Extermination of the Brâncoveanu and Cantacuzino Families..., p. 101.
- 16
The diploma of 1695, issued by Emperor Leopold, conferring upon Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. See also the other charges in Anton-Maria del Chiaro Fiorentino, The Revolutions of Wallachia..., pp. 117–118.
- 17
A charter dated 27 March 1712, by which Emperor Charles VI of Habsburg granted Constantin Brâncoveanu protection within the Empire and assistance in times of need. Library of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest (BAR), Manuscripts – Rare Books, p. 473.
- 18
Emil Vîrtosu, The Secret Notes of Constantin-Vodă Brâncoveanu, Bucharest, 1942, p. 186. Berat – decree of accession. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 164.
- 19
Reports from foreign ambassadors in Istanbul emphasise that Mr Muntean was tortured to make him reveal the whereabouts of his assets.
- 20
For Constantin Brâncoveanu’s foreign policy, see, for example: Paul Cernovodeanu, ‘The Era of Constantin Brâncoveanu’, in The History of the Romanians, vol. V, ed. Vigil Cândea, Bucharest, Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003, pp. 248–269; Ibid., Amidst the Turmoil of Perils. The Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688–1714), Bucharest, 1997; Constantin Bălan, ‘The Reign and Personality of Voivode Constantin Brâncoveanu. Some Considerations’, in Revista de istorie, vol. 41, 1988, no. 4, pp. 841–860.
- 21
Andrei Pippidi, ‘An episode in Romanian-British relations: The correspondence between Constantin Brâncoveanu and Lord Paget’, in Constantin Brâncoveanu, ed. Paul Cernovodeanu and Florin Constantiniu, Bucharest, Ed. Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1989, pp. 139–155.
- 22
The History of Wallachia from October 1688 to March 1717. The Anonymous Chronicle..., p. 110.
- 23
The Treaty of Vadul Hușilor, signed in July 1711, restored the Ottoman Empire’s international military prestige, which had been severely damaged by the major defeats following the Battle of Vienna in 1683. Russia, meanwhile, was kept at bay from the Black Sea region for a time. Mihai Maxim, Brăila 1711. New Ottoman Documents, Brăila, Brăila Museum, Istros Publishers, 2011, pp. 88–89.
- 24
From 1538, the Port of Brăila was incorporated into the Ottoman provinces as a kaza, forming part of the Sanjak of Silistra within the Beylik of Rumelia. Mihai Maxim, Brăila 1711. New Ottoman Documents..., p. 22.
- 25
Subaș – among the Turks, a kind of prefect or policeman. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 1257.
- 26
Cadiu – a Turkish judge. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 214.
- 27
The History of Wallachia from October 1688 to March 1717. An anonymous chronicle..., p. 125.
- 28
Nazâr – the commander of a Turkish fortress. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 853.
- 29
Mihai Maxim, Brăila 1711. New Ottoman documents..., pp. 107, 109.
- 30
Valeriu Veliman, Romanian–Ottoman Relations as Reflected in Turkish Documents, 1711–1821. Turkish Documents, Bucharest, 1984, p. 95.
- 31
However, in previous centuries, the 14th to the 16th centuries, marked by direct military confrontations, the autonomy of the Romanian territories had another explanation: the Turks’ fear of ‘internal and international complications, owing to the remarkable resilience of the Romanians and the interests of the major Christian powers in the region’. Mihai Maxim, The Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire (1400–1600), in The History of the Romanians, vol. IV, ed. Ștefan Ștefănescu, Camil Mureșan, Tudor Teoteoi, Bucharest, Ed. Enciclopedică, 2001, p. 537.
- 32
Mihai Maxim, Brăila 1711. New Ottoman Documents..., p. 89.
- 33
Mihai Maxim, Brăila 1711. New Ottoman Documents..., pp. 80–81.
- 34
Mumbașir – police officer. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 841.
- 35
Valeriu Veliman, Romanian–Ottoman Relations in Turkish Documents, 1711–1821. Turkish Documents..., p. 85.
- 36
Mihai Maxim, Brăila 1711. New Ottoman Documents..., p. 97.
- 37
Timar – in the Ottoman world, a holding or fief granted on certain conditions, linked to the performance of military service.
- 38
Mihai Maxim, ‘The Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire’, in The History of the Romanians, vol. V..., pp. 822–825.
- 39
Valeriu Veliman, Romanian–Ottoman Relations in Turkish Documents, 1711–1821. Turkish Documents…, p. 85. See also Mihai Maxim, ‘The Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire’, in The History of the Romanians, vol. V…, p. 825.
- 40
Mihai Maxim, A History of Romanian–Ottoman Relations, with new documents from the Turkish archives, Vol. I, The Classical Period, Brăila, Brăila Museum, Istros Publishers, 2012, p. 215.
- 41
Mihai Maxim, Romano-Ottomanica. Essays, Documents from the Turkish Archives, Istanbul, The ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 173–197.
- 42
Mihai Maxim, ‘The Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire’, in The History of the Romanians, vol. V..., p. 824.
- 43
Capugiu – a high-ranking Turkish chamberlain, sent with a firman to behead the deposed princes. Augustin Scriban, Dictionary of the Romanian Language..., p. 229.
- 44
Anton-Maria del Chiaro Fiorentino, The Revolutions of Wallachia..., p. 129.
- 45
Valeriu Veliman, Romanian–Ottoman Relations in Turkish Documents, 1711–1821. Turkish Documents..., p. 100.
- 46
Dapontes’ text, translated from Greek, was published by Constantin Erbiceanu in Greek Chroniclers Who Wrote about the Romanians during the Phanariot Period, Bucharest, 1888, p. 172.
- 47
The Register of the Grand Logothete (1692–1714), ed. Melentina Bâzgan, Pitești, Paralela 45, 2009, p. 425.
- 48
See, for example, the studies published in the volume Constantin Brâncoveanu and his contribution to the enrichment of the cultural, educational, spiritual and socio-philanthropic heritage of Wallachia in the European context of the 18th century, Bucharest, Basilica, 2014, as well as the articles in the volume published under the auspices of the ‘Nicolae Iorga’ Institute of History, Constantin Brâncoveanu, ed. Paul Cernovodeanu and Florin Constantiniu, Bucharest, Ed. Academiei RSR, 1989.
- 49
See, for example: T. G. Bulat, ‘Constantin-Vodă’s Donations: Brâncoveanu for the Orthodox East’, in Biserica Ortodoxă Română, LXXXII, 1964, nos. 9–10, pp. 931–944; Ioan Rămureanu, ‘Constantin Brâncoveanu – Supporter of Orthodoxy’, in The Romanian Orthodox Church, LXXXII, 1964, nos. 9–10, pp. 916–930; Oana-Mădălina Popescu, ‘Testimonies concerning the Holy Martyrs of the Brâncoveanu Family…’, pp. 44–53.
- 50
The difficult situation faced by Christians, characterised by economic and legal subordination to Muslims, was often a reason for their conversion to Islam in the regions that were part of the Ottoman Empire.
- 51
The Register of the Grand Logothete (1692–1714)..., pp. 89, 132, 553.
- 52
The Register of the Grand Logothete (1692–1714)..., pp. 77, 118, 249.
- 53
The Register of the Grand Logothete (1692–1714)..., pp. 117, 334, 362, 247.
- 54
The Register of the Grand Logothete (1692–1714)..., p. 119.
- 55
The Documents of the Mavrocordas in the Collection of the Bucharest Municipal Museum, ed. Grina-Mihaela Rafailă, Bucharest, 2016, pp. 63–64.
- 56
The documents of the Mavrocordatos family held in the collection of the Bucharest Municipal Museum..., p. 82.
- 57
The documents of the Mavrocordas in the collection of the Bucharest Municipal Museum..., p. 159.
- 58
The Mavrocordatos family documents held by the Bucharest Municipal Museum..., p. 166.
- 59
Anton-Maria del Chiaro Fiorentino, The Revolutions of Wallachia..., pp. 113, 120.
- 60
That is to say, the sultan, Ahmed III.
- 61
Păuna Greceanu, who took the name Cantacuzino, was the wife of Ștefan Cantacuzino, Prince of Wallachia from April 1714 to January 1716.
- 62
Radu Popescu, the Vornic, The Histories of the Princes of Wallachia..., pp. 209–210.
- 63
Anton Maria del Chiaro Fiorentino also recounts her escape in TheRevolutions of Wallachia, p. 140: Lady Păuna, upon learning of the deaths of her husband and father-in-law, hid herself and her children, in disguise, in a safe place with the help of friends, in order to save them, despite the Turks’ desperate attempts to capture them. She then chartered a ship and set sail from Constantinople, at great risk, landing four weeks later at Messina. From there, she travelled with the children to Naples and, via Bologna and Ferrara, reached Venice, where they were taken in, with every care, at the home of Mr Nicolai Caragiani; and after five days they set off for Vienna.
- 64
See Alexandru Vasilescu, Oltenia under the Austrians, Bucharest, 1929, pp. 17–24; reprinted in Alexandru Vasilescu, ‘Păuna Doamna’, in The Boyar Families of Moldavia and Wallachia. A Historical, Genealogical and Biographical Encyclopaedia. The Cantacuzino Family, vol. III, ed. Mihai Dimitrie Sturdza, Bucharest, 2014, pp. 182–183.
- 65
Nicolae Iorga, On the Cantacuzinos: Historical Studies Based in Part on Unpublished Documents from the Archive of Mr G. Gr. Cantacuzino, Bucharest, 1902, pp. 285–289.
- 66
Nicolae Iorga, Women in the History of Our Nation, ed. Lucian Pricop, Bucharest, Cartex, 2014, p. 47.
- 67
Alexandru Vasilescu, ‘An Adventurer: Radu Cantacuzino’, in The Boyar Families of Moldavia and Wallachia. A Historical, Genealogical and Biographical Encyclopaedia. The Cantacuzino Family..., pp. 194–197.
- 68
Alexandru Vasilescu, ‘An Adventurer: Radu Cantacuzino’, in The Boyar Families of Moldavia and Wallachia: A Historical, Genealogical and Biographical Encyclopaedia. The Cantacuzino Family..., p. 195.
- 69
Andrei Pippidi, Mihai Dimitrie Sturdza, The Constantinian Order, in The Aristocratic Families of Moldavia and Wallachia: A Historical, Genealogical and Biographical Encyclopaedia. The Cantacuzino Family..., p. 203.
- 70
BAR, Manuscripts – Rare Books, p. 434.
- 71
See also Gherasim Cristea, ‘God’s Punishment for the Murder of the Brâncoveanu Saints’, in Constantin Basarab Brâncoveanu, Slatina, Craiova University Press, 2004, pp. 493–498.
- 72
Indeed, Constantin Cantacuzino had also been reprimanded by the Patriarch of Jerusalem for his actions. Nicolae Iorga, ‘Constantin the Steward Cantacuzino’, in Revista Fundațiilor Regale, Year II. 1935, No. 7, pp. 3–22; article reprinted in Nicolae Iorga, ‘Constantin the Chamberlain Cantacuzino’, in The Boyar Families of Moldavia and Wallachia. A Historical, Genealogical and Biographical Encyclopaedia. The Cantacuzino Family..., pp. 135–139.
- 73
Nicolae Stoicescu, Dictionary of the Great Rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, 14th–17th centuries, Bucharest, Ed. Enciclopedică română, 1971, p. 140.
- 74
See also the family tree in Constantin Rezachevici, Lords and Boyars: The Craiovești-Basarabi, Cantacuzini and Drăculești Families in Relation to the Comana Area, Bucharest, Total Publishing, 2012, p. 84.
- 75
Constantin Rezachevici, Lords and Boyars. The Craiovești-Basarabi, Cantacuzini and Drăculești families in relation to the Comana area..., p. 63.
- 76
Nicolae Stoicescu, Dictionary of the Great Rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, 14th–17th centuries..., p. 145.