1. Transformative learning and critical pedagogy
Pedagogy and transformative learning form the central thematic focus1 [with regard to school-age children]. Transformative learning is based on Habermas’s theory 2, who is regarded as the successor to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. The basic tenet of transformative learning is that personal and individual transformation requires a deep knowledge and understanding of historical reality, through which the liberating function of education is realised.
Transformative learning requires a certain capacity for reflection, namely the critical examination of the assumptions upon which one’s personal beliefs are built. Learning that incorporates this function contributes, according to one view, to the correction of previous misconceptions 3. The starting point for Mezirow’s pedagogical problematisation 4 is the observation that adults’ perspectives on reality differ. This diversity stems from each individual’s personal system of principles and conceptions, which is formed at various stages of the socialisation process, as this unfolds in diverse environments throughout their maturation 5. Mezirow draws on the conclusions of Habermas, who, following the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, identifies three domains in which people direct their interest in knowledge 6. These domains are the technical, the practical and the liberating. Mezirow correlates these domains of cognitive interest with three forms of learning: instrumental learning, communicative learning and liberating learning 7.
2. Critical pedagogy
Critical pedagogy emerged in Germany as the critical science of education 8 in the 1960s. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the concept of ‘critical pedagogy’ was first used by Henry Giroux 9, Stanley Aronowitz 10 and Peter McLaren 11, to conceptually define a new form of pedagogical thought and practice that emerged in the early 1980s in the United States of America. Critical pedagogy can be described more as a set of pedagogical and didactic proposals, which converge within a concrete framework of aims 12, rather than as a pedagogical theory possessing strict and solid internal cohesion.
In any case, the relationship between [critical pedagogy] and critical theory is not disputed. McLaren emphasises the relationship between critical pedagogy and the Frankfurt School and identifies the theoretical framework that critical theory has provided for critical pedagogy 13. He raises the question of the role played by the school in politicising and raising pupils’ awareness of issues of equality and social justice 14, highlighting, on the one hand, the danger of the school functioning as a structure of social reproduction, and, on the other hand, the possibility of transforming it into a space for questioning and reacting against social injustice – that is, into a laboratory for agents of change. Specifically, he asks: ‘Do we wish to adapt pupils to the existing social order, ensuring that they become functionaries within it, or do we want to ensure that pupils do not resign themselves to a society that exploits workers, demonises people of colour, abuses women, grants privileges to the rich, undertakes acts of imperialist aggression against other countries, colonises the mind and erases any trace of collective consciousness from the national spirit? Or perhaps we wish to create spaces of freedom in our classrooms and call upon pupils to become agents of transformation and hope?”15.
According to proponents of critical pedagogy, knowledge, as it is presented in current educational systems, is not free, neutral or objective, but is dependent on various interests. Knowledge is a social construct, resulting from an individual’s network of social relationships, within the social context in which they live and develop, under the influence of the particular characteristics of each historical moment. The aim of critical pedagogy is to empower and encourage the weak and disadvantaged, so that they may create institutions and practices that serve their own interests, with the ultimate goal of transforming social inequalities and injustices 16.
Knowledge is a social construct, resulting from an individual’s network of social relationships, within the social context in which they live and develop, under the influence of the specific characteristics of each historical moment.
From this perspective, the civic role of education is self-evident, as education is treated as a social and civic act 17. The above approach is based on the notion that education can only offer pupils certain paths and directions for achieving social transformation.
3. Critical pedagogy and religious education
In response to the question regarding the application of the principles of critical pedagogy to religious education, as provided within the school setting, A. Wright 18 proposes a pedagogical strategy of ‘the search for theological truth’ through ‘critical realism’19 Wright places the search for truth and an authentic way of life at the very heart of setting the objectives for religious education, which leads him to ground his theory in philosophical and theological arguments. He begins with the basic principle of critical pedagogy, according to which the world is not merely what humans perceive, but reality extends beyond and above their cognitive and linguistic capacities, as well as their lived experiences.
To the question of whether religion can reveal reality or whether it itself constitutes a social construct – in other words, yet another perspective on reality – Wright responds with the theory of critical realism 20; in other words, according to Olof Franck 21, the position that reality is always approached through the prism of particular personal, social and cultural characteristics 22. For this diagnosis to be possible, it is necessary for the whole person to participate in the search for truth. In fact, Wright observes that a rational approach to reality involves an element of subjectivity. He distinguishes between truth and human perception of it. Within this framework, the search for truth, according to Wright, is structured around a teachable pedagogical strategy, which involves five criteria: conformity, coherence, productivity, simplicity and depth 23.
Wright’s proposal regarding the application of critical theory in religious education has sparked an intense debate. Franck has grouped the arguments presented in the public dialogue concerning Wright’s proposal into three categories 24.
In the first group, Franck brings together arguments relating to the distinctive nature of faith. These arguments are based on the view that faith cannot constitute a subject of scientific research in accordance with the principles and methods of modern science. Whatever the various objections raised in the wide-ranging public debate on this subject, they fail to overcome the observation that [all] religious beliefs are held to be ‘eternal truths’, which are not subject to rational critical scrutiny and, consequently, can be neither confirmed nor refuted from a logical 25 perspective. On the other hand, however, it is emphasised that the manner in which these truths are expressed and experienced in each social context needs to be assessed or investigated.
The second group comprises arguments concerning the pluralistic characteristics of contemporary society. Religious pluralism precludes the possibility of constructing a common epistemological framework for the study of all religious and philosophical traditions as a means of critically addressing the religious phenomenon within a secularised context 26.
In the third group, Franck brings together arguments according to which religiosity leads to certain individual and social behaviours, which often do not align with what is generally accepted in contemporary societies. These behaviours relativise the notion of good and evil, since what is good for one believer may not coincide with what is considered good by a believer of a different religious tradition or by a non-believer. Even if it is accepted that social behaviours dictated by human religiosity are, for the most part, good, the question of whether religious truth can be objectified through specific epistemological criteria is contested 27.
Even if it is accepted that the social behaviours dictated by human religiosity are, for the most part, good, the question of whether religious truth can be objectified through specific epistemological criteria is contested.
4. Critical pedagogy and Orthodox Christian education
An objective approach to the question concerning the nature and position of critical reflection with regard to religious truth, as taught within the framework of Greek religious education, requires, in addition to a pedagogical interpretation, a theological interpretation and proposal. This fact is overlooked today, fuelling suspicion and misunderstandings regarding religious faith and its teaching in schools. In many cases, teaching about God or concerning God is perceived as imposing this teaching on each and every pupil. This perception also fosters, within the field of religious education, the belief that such education fails to respect freedom and does not encourage the development of critical thinking within the school environment. The challenge of devising a teaching model that will ensure the pupil’s freedom is well known, whilst at the same time building and developing their critical capacity and attitude towards the content taught in school and, subsequently, towards life, society and history.
How is it possible for a pupil to retain the freedom to choose their religious orientation when they are compulsorily taught the tenets of the Christian faith? It would be particularly useful to investigate the reasons underlying the view that the teaching of the Orthodox Christian tradition conflicts with the principles of religious freedom and critical thinking. In this context, the conception of what Orthodox Christian truth is and how it is taught plays a significant role. The impression that critical reflection on the attitudes and religious beliefs of pupils within religious education is rooted in the distinction between the epistemology of Western Christianity and the method of knowing God within the Orthodox [Christian] tradition. A rationalist conception of Christianity and of the truth of the Gospel perceives Christian teaching as a cognitive good, which is assimilated by human beings through reason. In this case, human reason is regarded as the supreme instrument of human nature, through which man seeks to know and explain himself and the world.
According to Orthodox [Christian] teaching, the knowledge of the Truth is not an intellectual fact, but an existential, personal one. The personal nature of divine knowledge precludes the possibility of its objectification, which is a characteristic of worldly scientific knowledge. However, this does not diminish the value and importance of [divine knowledge], for it is precisely this existential and lived nature of it that constitutes its confirmation, in contrast to scientific knowledge, which is verified through experimental methods. Orthodox [Christian] truth, in other words, the knowledge of God, represents a fact of loving communion between God and man, which is not imposed upon man, but is offered to him as a28e. Consequently, the knowledge of God presupposes man’s free consent, whereby he entrusts himself to divine truth not intellectually, but existentially and empirically.
According to Orthodox [Christian] teaching, the knowledge of the Truth is not an intellectual fact, but an existential, personal one.
In accordance with Orthodox [Christian] epistemology, there are two types of knowledge: the worldly and the transcendent, in full analogy with the fundamental theological distinction between the created and the Uncreated 29. The Uncreated is approached through faith, and the created through science. Each of these two forms of knowledge follows its own method 30. Based on the above approach, human reason and critical faculties are neither called into question nor underestimated. Human wisdom is not condemned, but its absolutisation is guarded against. Divine truth, according to the Orthodox [Christian] tradition, does not constitute a set of transcendent truths which man is called upon to accept, but a Person, and man is called upon to experience his relationship with That Person as an empirical reality. Furthermore, this truth is not a human achievement, but a gift from God, which man evaluates and chooses whether or not to accept.
According to Orthodox [Christian] epistemology, there are two types of knowledge: the worldly and the transcendent. […] Human wisdom is not condemned, but its absolutisation is guarded against. Divine Truth, according to the Orthodox [Christian] tradition, does not constitute a set of transcendent truths which man is called to accept, but a Person, and man is called to experience his relationship with Her as an empirical reality.
Man is powerless to approach the transcendent Truth by his own efforts. However, since he himself desires this and chooses it, the transcendent Truth draws near to man and is revealed to him in the Person of Christ, the God-Man. ‘In Christ, the transcendent Truth becomes internal to man. The God-Man proves the truth by revealing it in Himself and through Himself. Thus, He proves it not syllogistically, nor rationally, but through His own living personality. He does not merely possess the truth; He Himself is the Truth. In Him, being and Truth are one and the same. Therefore, through His Person, He determines both the truth and the method for knowing the truth: ‘whoever abides in Him will know the truth, and the truth will set them free from sin, from falsehood and from death’ (cf. John 8:32)31
Consequently, the limited human mind is powerless to approach, by its own means, the transcendent dimension of its own self and of the world, as well as the truth of God. However, God does not leave man in ignorance. He does not violate the fundamental characteristic of the human person—namely, their freedom—by imposing His divinity upon man, ensnaring human reason in a relationship of domination and thereby transforming the path to salvation into a one-way street for man. On the contrary, God ordains the Incarnation of the Word so that the sole path towards perdition and death may be transformed into the possibility for humankind to follow the exact opposite path—in other words, the path towards reunion with God, in other words, with the Truth and with eternal Life. Thus, according to Orthodox [Christian] teaching, man’s inability to draw near to the truth of the Gospel is transformed into a possibility when man resolves and chooses to make his self receptive to divine grace.
5. Conclusions
It follows from the above that Orthodox [Christian] truth is incompatible with the demonstrative methods of science. However, this does not mean that it is presented to man as an unprovable authority, which he must accept without question. Such a misunderstanding of Christian truths can give rise to demagogic expectations of religious indoctrination within religious education. If the Orthodox [Christian] faith is not contrary to reason and human freedom, then the teaching of Orthodox Orthodox [Christian] truth in religious education lessons is not at odds with critical thinking, which, together with doubt, constitutes processes that lead the pupil to the formation of a mature faith 32.
If the Orthodox [Christian] faith is not contrary to reason and the freedom of the human person, then the teaching of Orthodox Orthodox [Christian] truth in Religious Education lessons is not at odds with critical thinking, which, in conjunction with doubt, constitutes processes that lead the pupil to the formation of a mature faith.
On the contrary, [such teaching] offers pupils opportunities for self-knowledge, that is, for understanding their own nature and for the free development of their personality 33. Orthodox [Christian] truth addresses the psychosomatic human being and provides the foundations for their psychosomatic and spiritual perfection.
Finally, according to Orthodox [Christian] epistemology, since Truth is a Person, knowledge of Him is not an intellectual conquest, but a free encounter between man and God. This encounter cannot take place unless man responds to the call and unless divine grace works together with him. Religious education in schools neither has the right nor is it capable of attaining true empirical knowledge of God. The Christian God does not impose Himself through preaching and hearing, but is freely known by embracing Him; that is to say, He is embraced by those who desire Him through the purification of the mind and heart from passions, and through the acquisition of virtues. Therefore, there cannot be a religious education consistent with [Orthodox] Christian epistemology if it nullifies the freedom of the human person. The [Orthodox] Christian truth represents a proposalinvitation to fallen humanity to transcend its self-imposed confinement within the limits of human reason and to expand the self towards the supermundane and universal dimensions offered by its creation in the image and likeness of God 34. The challenge is formidable, but it remains, as always, a choice.
Since Truth is a Person, knowledge of Him is not an intellectual conquest, but a free encounter between man and God. This encounter cannot take place unless man responds to the call and unless divine grace works together with him. Religious education in schools neither has the right nor is it capable of attaining true empirical knowledge of God.
- 1
The study was presented at the International Symposium on Early Childhood Education, on the theme ‘Pedagogy and Transformative Learning at School Age’, organised by the University of Ioannina from 15 to 17 May 2015. For the Greek-language edition, see Evangelos Pepes, ‘Critical Pedagogy and Religious Education’, in Maria Sakellariou, Andromachi Bouna, Panagiota Strati (eds.), Conference Proceedings. 20th International Symposium on Early Childhood Education ‘Transformative Pedagogy and Learning in Early Childhood’, University of Ioannina, 15–17 May 2015, Pedio Publications S.A., Athens, 2019, pp. 197–206. It should be noted that, with the author’s consent, we have added—in addition to some annotations—clarifications of meanings, concepts, etc., to make the text easier to read, placing these in square brackets (translator’s note).
- 2
Jürgen Habermas, born in 1929 and still alive at the time of this study’s translation into Romanian (January 2026), is a German philosopher and sociologist, recognised as one of the central figures of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, representing the school of thought known as critical theory. The main elements of his thought are: 1) the theory of communicative action, according to which he maintains that understanding and cooperation between people are achieved through rational communication, not through force or manipulation; 2) the emancipatory purpose of knowledge, whereby he asserts that the aim of education and knowledge is not merely the accumulation of information, but also the liberation of the individual from social, ideological or economic constraints; 3) Critical pedagogy, which has put forward ideas that have profoundly influenced theories of transformative learning; these theories emphasise awareness and critical reflection, as well as personal and social change (translator’s note).
- 3
Jack Mezirow, ‘How critical reflection triggers transformative learning’, in Jack Mezirow & Associates, Fostering critical reflection in adulthood: a guide to transformative and emancipatory learning, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1990, p. 18.
- 4
Jack Mezirow (1923–2014) was an American educator and theorist, known as the father of Transformative Learning Theory, which is one of the most influential modern concepts in the field of adult education (translator’s note).
- 5
Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1991, pp. 2–7.
- 6
[See] Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Heinemann, London, 1972.
- 7
Mezirow & Associates, Fostering Critical Reflection, pp. 1–20; Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions, pp. 72–89.
- 8
Klaus Mollenhauer, ‘Pädagogik und Rationalität’, in Deutsche Schule, 56 (1964), pp. 665–676.
- 9
Henry A. Giroux (b. 1943), an American-Canadian professor and theorist, is regarded as one of the founders of critical pedagogy. He has taught at several universities, including Cornell and McMaster (Canada). Giroux argues that education must be a political and ethical act, capable of shaping critical citizens who are aware of power structures and social inequalities (translator’s note).
- 10
Stanley Aronowitz (1933–2021), an American sociologist and cultural critic, was influenced by Marxism and the labour movements. He worked at the City University of New York. In his writings, he analysed the relationship between education, work and ideology, arguing that schools reproduce the economic and cultural inequalities of society (translator’s note).
- 11
Peter McLaren (b. 1948), a Canadian educator and author, is one of the leading advocates of radical critical pedagogy. He sees the school as a space for resistance and social transformation, where pupils can become aware of the injustices of the world and learn how to take action for change. It should be noted that Henry Giroux, Stanley Aronowitz and Peter McLaren are the leading theorists of critical pedagogy, an educational movement that emerged in the 1980s, inspired by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Essentially, these three scholars have helped to define critical pedagogy as an intellectual and educational movement that seeks to free education from its apparent neutrality and transform it into an instrument of social justice and human emancipation (translator’s note).
- 12
Panagiota Gounari, Giorgos Grollios, Critical Pedagogy: A Collection of Texts, Gutenberg, Athens, 2010, p. 281.
- 13
[See] Peter McLaren, Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 2007.
- 14
Gounari & Grollios, Critical Pedagogy, p. 279.
- 15
[See] Peter McLaren, Schooling as a Ritual Performance: Towards a Political Economy of Educational Symbols and Gestures, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1986.
- 16
Peter McLaren, Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education, Allyn and Bacon. Boston, 2007, p. 281.
- 17
Stephen Brookfield, The Power of Critical Theory: Liberating Adult Learning and Teaching, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2005, p. 354.
- 18
Andrew Wright (b. 1958) is a contemporary British theorist in the field of religious education and one of the leading authors who have sought to link critical pedagogy with religious education. He has put forward the theory of ‘critical realism’, which he applies in his analysis of the relationship between faith, reason and education. Indeed, he seeks to combine a realist philosophy of knowledge with critical pedagogy, in order to provide an educational framework that promotes critical thinking, theological reflection and interfaith dialogue (translator’s note).
- 19
[See] Andrew Wright, Critical Religious Education, Multiculturalism and the Pursuit of Truth, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 2007.
- 20
Which he sets out in the book cited above (translator’s note).
- 21
Olof Franck (b. 1958) is a contemporary Swedish researcher and lecturer, specialising in the philosophy of education, religious education and applied ethics, known, in particular, for his work on critical realism, moral education and the relationship between religion, values and democratic education. He is regarded as one of the most important contemporary European voices in the field of critical religious education, continuing and developing A. Wright’s ideas on critical realism and the search for truth in the educational process (translator’s note).
- 22
Olof Franck, ‘Critical religious education: highlighting religious truth-claims in non-denominational educational contexts’, in British Journal of Religious Education, 37/3 (2015), p. 226.
- 23
Wright, Critical Religious Education, p. 220.
- 24
Franck, Critical Religious Education, pp. 227–231.
- 25
Ibid.
- 26
Ibid., pp. 228–229.
- 27
Franck, Critical Religious Education, pp. 229–230.
- 28
[See] John 7:17.
- 29
God, the Uncreated One, who is in the Holy Trinity, be praised and glorified (translator’s note).
- 30
Christos Vasilopoulos, Religious Education in Schools, Vania, Thessaloniki, 2008, p. 46.
- 31
Justinos Popović, The Way of God-Knowledge. Chapters on Asceticism and Epistemology, Gregoris, Athens, 1992, p. 181.
- 32
Alexandros Kakavoulis, Moral Development and Education, Vol. II, Athens, 1999, p. 274.
- 33
Heracles Rerakis, Contemporary Teaching of Religious Education, P. Pournaras, Thessaloniki, 2007, p. 63.
- 34
[See] Fac. 1:26.